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There has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of deductive reasoning. Many
researchers no longer think it is appropriate to ask people to assume premises and
decide what necessarily follows, with the results evaluated by binary extensional logic.
Most every day and scientific inference is made from more or less confidently held
beliefs and not assumptions, and the relevant normative standard is Bayesian probability
theory. We argue that the study of “uncertain deduction” should directly ask people to
assign probabilities to both premises and conclusions, and report an experiment using
this method. We assess this reasoning by two Bayesian metrics: probabilistic validity
and coherence according to probability theory. On both measures, participants perform
above chance in conditional reasoning, but they do much better when statements are
grouped as inferences, rather than evaluated in separate tasks.
Keywords: uncertain premises, conditional reasoning, new paradigm psychology of reasoning, p-validity,
coherence, explicit inference, fallacy
Introduction
Paradigm Shift in the Psychology of Reasoning
The psychology of deductive reasoning is undergoing a paradigm shift, which is the consequence of
the introduction of Bayesian approaches into the field (see Oaksford and Chater, 2007, 2010; Over,
2009; Manktelow et al., 2011; Elqayam and Over, 2012; Evans, 2012; Baratgin et al., 2013, 2014). In
the real world, there are few propositions that people can hold are certainly true, or certainly false,
and most of their beliefs come in degrees, which are technically subjective probabilities. We may
believe that a grant application has a 50-50 chance of success, or that we will probably be happier if
we take a promotion with more responsibility, or that we are unlikely to get on with the new boss
we met this morning. It is precisely such uncertain beliefs that we need to take into account when
making decisions and solving problems in everyday life. Essential to this process is the ability to
combine uncertain beliefs and draw inferences from them, and this is what the new psychology of
reasoning is concerned with studying.
The method of study that dominated the field for 40 years or so is the traditional binary deduc-
tion paradigm (Evans, 2002), inspired by extensional logic and intended to test whether people were
capable of logical reasoning without formal training. With this method, participants are given the
premises of a logical argument, instructed to assume that they are true, and asked to decide whether
a purported conclusion necessarily follows. They were expected to answer “yes” for arguments con-
sidered valid in extensional logic and “no” for those considered invalid. Thus, measured, however,
logical reasoning is observed to be generally poor and subject to various cognitive biases (for recent
reviews, see Evans, 2007; Manktelow, 2012).
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We believe that this traditional paradigm maps quite poorly
on to the requirements of real world reasoning. Two key fea-
tures of the method, which directly reflect the classical binary
logic used to assess the accuracy of reasoning, are the instruction
to assume the premises and the classification of all statements
as simply true or false. High expertise in assumption-based rea-
soning generally requires specialized training and when logical
problems of this kind are administered to naïve participants,
we find it unsurprising that error rates are high. We also
note that such reasoning loads heavily on working memory
and that those of high intelligence do better at these tasks
(Evans, 2007; Stanovich, 2011). But everyday reasoning can-
not be a specialized tricky business requiring elite profession-
als and condemning the majority to mistakes. If that were
the case, then most people would be incapable of intelligent
actions. For these reasons, a number of authors have ques-
tioned the relevance of extensional logic and the standard
deduction paradigm based upon it (e.g., Oaksford and Chater,
1998, 2007; Evans, 2002; Evans and Over, 2004; Pfeifer and
Kleiter, 2010). The new approach treats reasoning as concern-
ing degrees of belief, rather than assumed truth and falsity,
and allows that inferences can be drawn with a varying degrees
of confidence (Oaksford and Chater, 2007; Evans and Over,
2013).
What is yet to emerge, however, is a clear alternative method
for studying reasoning to the traditional deduction paradigm.
There are a number of studies which have relaxed instructions, so
that participants are given premises but not instructed to assume
that they are true, and in which they are sometimes permit-
ted to express degrees of confidence in the conclusions. These
are generally known as pragmatic reasoning instructions. Such
instructions have been applied to one of the most commonly
studied tasks, that of conditional inference. Participants are pre-
sented with a conditional and asked whether conclusions fol-
low for four simple inferences, two of which are considered, in
most normative systems, as logically valid and two invalid. See
Table 1.
When the traditional binary paradigm and abstract materials
are used (e.g., If the letter is A then the number is 5), partici-
pants only show good logical performance onMP, which is nearly
always endorsed. MT is also valid but is not endorsed as often
as MP, and AC and DA are commonly endorsed, despite being
invalid (Evans and Over, 2004). When realistic content is intro-
duced, however, this can substantially affect responding. It has
been known for some years that peoplemay resist the simple valid
inference MP when they disbelieve the conditional statement
(George, 1995; Stevenson and Over, 1995; Politzer, 2005). For
example, given the argument
TABLE 1 | The four conditional inferences commonly studied by
psychologists.
Modus ponens MP If p then q; p therefore q Valid
Denial of the antecedent DA If p then q; not-p therefore not-q Invalid
Affirmation of the consequent AC If p then q; q therefore p Invalid
Modus tollens MT If p then q; not-q therefore not-p Valid
If the UK builds more nuclear power plants the environment
will be safer. (1)
The UK will build more nuclear power plants.
Therefore, the environment will be safer.
Many participants will say that the conclusion does not follow,
despite the obvious logic. As the early studies also showed, the
exact nature of the instructions is critical. If strict traditional
reasoning instructions are employed, with participants asked to
assume the premises, they are more likely to resist belief influ-
ences and reinstate the inference. However, a recent study has
shown the ability to suppress the influence of prior belief on con-
ditional reasoning is restricted to those of higher cognitive ability,
even within a university student population (Evans et al., 2010).
This difference only occurred under traditional deductive rea-
soning instructions; with pragmatic reasoning instructions, high
ability participants were equally belief “biased.” These findings
(andmany others) suggest to us that assumption-based reasoning
is a form of effortful hypothetical thinking (Evans, 2007; Evans
and Stanovich, 2013). Belief-based reasoning by contrast is an
everyday, natural mode of thought that requires little effort.
If participants are to be allowed to express uncertainty in their
conclusions, then are we still studying deduction, or is this a form
of inductive inference? In a recent paper, we have shown that
deduction in the new paradigm is still distinct from inductive rea-
soning, but it is described better as what we call uncertain deduc-
tion (Evans and Over, 2013; see also Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2011).
That is, people make deductions in which the uncertainty of the
premises is reflected (rightly, according to probability theory) in
the uncertainty of the conclusion. Consider a famous piece of
reasoning by Sherlock Holmes (see Table 2).
Conan Doyle always used the term “deduction,” but many
readers may have wondered whether the reasoning described is
not some type of non-demonstrative inference, such as an abduc-
tive inference to the best explanation of the evidence. The conclu-
sions always seem to have a degree of uncertainty (despite being
rarely mistaken in the stories). We do not deny that some of
Holmes’ reasoning is inductive or abductive, and Conan Doyle
himself may not have had a very precise understanding of what
“deduction” means. But focus on the final sentence above: “Elim-
inate all other factors, and the one which remains must be the
truth.” The form of reasoning referred to here is the disjunctive
syllogism: the logical inference to q from the premises p or q and
not-p. Two “factors,” p and q, are referred to in p or q, and not-p
“eliminates” one of these, leaving q as what “must” follow. In the
story, p or q is Watson going toWigmore Street to send a letter or
a wire, and not-p is not going there to send a letter, with sending
a wire as the conclusion. This inference is clearly deductive, but
of course both p or q and not-p are uncertain to a degree, and the
conclusion falls short of certainty. Wigmore Street is just around
the corner fromBaker Street, andWatson could have gone out for
any number of reasons that would have placed him “opposite” the
post-office there.
In this example, Holmes’ disjunctive syllogism is classically
valid, in that its conclusion must be true given that its premises
are true, but it is not necessarily sound. A sound inference is a
valid inference the premises of which are actually true. In other
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TABLE 2 | Extract from Conan-Doyle’s, The Sign of Four (1890).
(HOLMES TO WATSON) “Observation shows me that you have been to the Wigmore Street Post-Office this morning, but deduction lets me know that when there you
dispatched a telegram.”
“Right!” said I. “Right on both points! But I confess that I don’t see how you arrived at it. It was a sudden impulse upon my part, and I have mentioned it to no one.”
“It is simplicity itself,” he remarked, chuckling at my surprise,–“so absurdly simple that an explanation is superfluous; and yet it may serve to define the limits of
observation and of deduction. Observation tells me that you have a little reddish mold adhering to your instep. Just opposite the Wigmore Street Office they have taken
up the pavement and thrown up some earth which lies in such a way that it is difficult to avoid treading in it in entering. The earth is of this peculiar reddish tint which is
found, as far as I know, nowhere else in the neighborhood. So much is observation. The rest is deduction.”
“How, then, did you deduce the telegram?”
“Why, of course I knew that you had not written a letter, since I sat opposite to you all morning. I see also in your open desk there that you have a sheet of stamps and a
thick bundle of post-cards. What could you go into the post-office for, then, but to send a wire? Eliminate all other factors, and the one which remains must be the truth.”
words, we can only be sure of the conclusion if we are sure of the
premises. The problem with the classical notion of soundness is
that, like classical validity, it is black and white. An argument is
either sound or it is not. We might feel some doubt that Holmes’
argument is sound, but we are losing something if we totally dis-
regard it. His premises are plausible, and his conclusion is more
likely than not. In an uncertain world, that is better than nothing.
The new paradigm is really an extension of the old that can deal
not just with contexts where statements can be assigned proba-
bilities of 1 (“true”) or 0 (“false”), but all values in between. We
cannot usually be certain of our premises and conclusions, and
have to ask what other degrees of confidence we should have in
them. Classical logic does not provide a means for doing this, and
we must look elsewhere. The obvious place is in Bayesian subjec-
tive probability theory, which extends classical logic in precisely
this manner.
Normative Assessment of Uncertain Deduction
The binary and extensional logic of the old deduction paradigm
has no means of evaluating inferences from uncertain premises.
However, two Bayesian standards, which we have discussed pre-
viously (Evans and Over, 2013), can be applied. The first is prob-
abilistic validity, or p-validity (Adams, 1998; see also Gilio, 2002;
Gilio and Over, 2012). Probabilistic validity is a generalization of
classical validity. The latter is truth-preserving. The conclusion
of a classically valid inference will be true given that the premises
are true: one cannot go from truth in the premises to falsity
in the conclusion. Similarly, p-valid inferences are probability-
preserving. One cannot go from high probability in the premise
of a p-valid single premise inference to low probability in the con-
clusion. For example, the inference of and-elimination, inferring
p from p and q, is p-valid because P(p and q)≤ P(p) for all coher-
ent probability assignments. People commit the conjunction fal-
lacy when they violate the p-validity of this inference (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983).
The matter is a bit more complex for inferences with two or
more premises. There is a problem of specifying how the prob-
abilities of two or more premises are to be combined, but this
is avoided by saying that a p-valid inference cannot take us from
low uncertainty in the premises to high uncertainty in the conclu-
sion. We define the uncertainty of a proposition p as one minus
its probability, 1—P(p). Then an inference with two or more
premises is p-valid if and only if the uncertainty of its conclusion
is not greater than the sum of the uncertainties of its premises for
all coherent probability assignments. A p-valid deduction from
premises cannot increase the uncertainty in the premises; it dif-
fers from induction in precisely this respect (Evans and Over,
2013)1. In Table 1, MP and MT are p-valid inferences, and AC
and DA are p-invalid inferences.
To illustrate with conditionals, consider two sets of assign-
ments of probabilities to the premises of an instance of the p-valid
inference MP, inferring q from the premises if p then q and p:
A B
if p then q 0.8 0.2
p 0.9 0.1
Consider set A first. The sum of the uncertainties of the
premises of A is (1 − 0.8) + (1 − 0.9) = 0.3. The uncertainty
of the conclusion should not exceed that limit, which implies that
we would violate p-validity if we assigned a probability to the con-
clusion q of less than 0.7. In that case, we would be in violation
of this Bayesian norm by being more uncertain of the conclusion
of a p-valid inference than we were of the premises. The formal
definition of the p-validity interval for the conclusion probability
is shown in Table 3. As the uncertainty of the premises increases,
the minimum probability value that can be assigned to the con-
clusion drops. Turning to B, we see that the uncertainties, 0.8 and
0.9, sum to 1.7.Whenever this figure is one or more, it means that
we may assign any probability between 0 and 1 to the conclu-
sion without violating p-validity. In other words, where premises
have low degrees of belief, p-validity can never be violated. This is
clearly something that researchers need to take into account. But
there is a parallel with the classical position. When we judge that
the premises of MP are false, we cannot violate classical valid-
ity by holding that the conclusion is also false, because we are
not claiming that the conclusion is false when the premises are
true.
A further important point about p-validity to stress is that it is
defined in terms of coherent probability assignments. For condi-
tional inferences, this coherence depends on the probability of the
natural language conditional, P(if p then q). There has been much
1A related, but extensional, definition of deduction is that the conclusion cannot
convey more semantic information than the premises (Johnson-Laird, 1983).
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TABLE 3 | Permitted intervals for conclusions probabilities for the four conditional inferences on two measures.
p-validity Coherence
Inference Min Max Min Max
MP max{x+y−1,0} 1 xy 1−y+xy
DA max{x+y−1,0} 1 (1−x)(1−y) 1−x(1−y)
AC max{x+y−1,0} 1 0 min{y/x,(1−y)/(1−x)}
MT max{x+y−1,0} 1 max{(1−x−y)/(1−x),(x+y−1)/x} 1
Notes: (1) In each case x = The probability of the major premise, if p then q, and y = the probability of the relevant minor premise, i.e., P(p) for MP, P(not-p) for DA, P(q) for AC, and
P(not-q) for MT.
(2) P(if p then q) = P(q|p) is assumed for calculation of the coherence but not p-validity intervals.
(3) For both measures, a “hit” is defined as an estimated conclusion probability which is between the minimum and maximum values shown in the table.
debate in logic, philosophy, and psychology about this probability
(Edgington, 1995; Evans and Over, 2004). One possibility is P(if p
then q) is the probability of thematerial conditional of elementary
extensional logic, P(not-p or q). If this is so, then the assignments
P(if p then q) = P(not-p or q) = 0.8, P(p) = 0.9, and P(q) = 0.7
are coherent. Another possibility is that P(if p then q) is the con-
ditional probability of q given p, P(q|p), and if this is so, P(if p
then q) = P(q|p) = 0.8, P(p) = 0.9, and P(q) = 0.7 are incoher-
ent. In fact, making the latter probability judgments is equivalent
to the conjunction fallacy, since P(p and q) = P(p)(q|p) = 0.72
and yet P(q) is judged to be 0.7. There are still other possibili-
ties for conditionals based on possible-worlds semantics (Evans
and Over, 2004). Nevertheless, judging P(if p then q) = 0.8, P(p)
= 0.9, and P(q) < 0.7 is incoherent for all these possible condi-
tionals and violates p-validity, by increasing uncertainty in the
conclusion of an inference, MP, which is p-valid for both inter-
pretations of the conditional. To make our study of p-validity
as general as possible, and to presuppose as little as possible, we
do not make any special assumption about P(if p then q) in our
study of p-validity.Wewill simply ask whether people conform to
p-validity bymaking the uncertainty of the conclusion in a condi-
tional inference less than or equal to the sum of the uncertainties
of the premises, and whether they conform more to p-validity
when they are given explicit inferences. We ask these questions
about both the normatively p-valid inferences of MP and MT,
and the normatively p-invalid inferences of AC and DA. As we
have noted above, people often endorsed AC and DA as “valid”
inferences in traditional studies in the binary paradigm, and we
wished to test whether they would also do in a probabilistic
study.
There are certainly strong arguments (Edgington, 1995) that
the probability of the natural language indicative conditional is
the conditional probability, that it satisfies what has been called
the Equation, P(if p then q) = P(q|p). If the Equation holds, the
appropriate normative rules for degrees of belief about the natu-
ral language conditional are those for conditional probability in
Bayesian probability theory. There is much empirical evidence to
support the Equation as descriptive of most people’s probability
judgments (Douven and Verbrugge, 2010; e.g., Evans et al., 2003;
Oberauer and Wilhelm, 2003; Over et al., 2007; Politzer et al.,
2010; Fugard et al., 2011; Singmann et al., 2014). The majority of
participants respect the Equation, but this is by no means univer-
sal. It is also found more often in those of high cognitive ability
(Evans et al., 2007). The evidence supporting the Equation is at its
strongest for the type of realistic conditionals used in our exper-
iment below (see Supplementary Material and Over et al., 2007;
Singmann et al., 2014), but we will still not assume that P(if p
then q)= P(q|p) in our study of p-validity, for the reason already
given.
The second Bayesian standard we will use to assess deduction
from uncertain premises is coherence itself. Here our method
does presuppose the Equation, P(if p then q) = P(q|p), for other-
wise we cannot lay down precise conditions for the coherence of
inferences that contain conditionals. We could use “p-consistent”
for this generalization of binary consistency (and have done so
in Evans and Over, 2013), but p-consistency has been defined
in more than one way (Adams, 1998, p. 181), and “coherence”
is standard in judgment and decision making. Degrees of belief
and subjective probability judgments are coherent when consis-
tent with the axioms of probability theory. Degrees of beliefs in
different statements that relate to each other in some way may
or may not be coherent. As we saw above, people are incoher-
ent and make judgments equivalent to the conjunction fallacy
if they judge that P(p and q) > P(p). In commenting upon this
fallacy, Tversky and Kahneman (1983, p. 313) stated that “. . . the
normative theory of judgment under uncertainty has treated the
coherence of belief as the touchstone of human rationality.” Their
findings have stimulated a rich literature on this fallacy and its
possible explanation in terms of the representativeness heuristic
(see Tentori et al., 2013, for a recent contribution). Our question
in this paper is not whether people are coherent in their con-
junction inferences, but rather whether they are coherent in their
conditional inferences, and whether their coherence is increased
when the conditional inferences are made explicit.
In our approach, P(q|p) is not necessarily given by the ratio,
P(p and q)/P(p), but rather by the Ramsey test (Edgington, 1995;
Evans and Over, 2004). Using this “test” on if p then q, we
hypothetically suppose that p holds, while making suppositional
changes in our beliefs to preserve consistency, and then make a
judgment about q. This procedure allows us to infer a value for
P(q|p) when P(p) cannot be fixed because p refers to an action
which we are trying to make a decision about, and even when we
judge that P(p)= 0 (see also Gilio, 2002; Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2009,
2010, 2011; Gilio and Over, 2012).
To illustrate our approach, with the Equation now assumed,
suppose we want to make a probability judgment about the
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conditional, “If Dr Adler submits her paper to the Journal of
Psychology Reports, it will be accepted.” We would use the Ram-
sey test and suppose that she does make the submission, and then
using our knowledge of her ability and the standards of the jour-
nal, we would make a judgment about the probable acceptance
of her paper. Suppose the result is a degree of belief of 0.8 that it
will be accepted under that supposition, and with P(if p then q)=
P(q|p), our degree of confidence in the conditional will be 0.8.
When we take it as certain that Dr Adler will submit her paper
to the journal, we should believe 0.80 that it will be accepted, and
any other figure would be incoherent. If, however, we have some
uncertainty about whether she will submit there or to a journal we
have no knowledge of, it becomes more complicated. Suppose we
believe only 0.50 that she will submit to the Journal of Psycholog-
ical Reports and will otherwise submit to the unknown journal.
Now we cannot give a specific probability to the paper being
accepted, for we lack information about the unknown journal and
it acceptance rate.
It is important to understand that in a case like this our belief
in the statement “Dr Adler’s paper will be accepted” is still con-
strained. It has to fall within a range of probability values in
order to be coherent. Consider the two extreme cases. At one
extreme, if Dr Adler submits to the unknown journal, it is cer-
tain that the paper will be accepted. So there is a 0.50 × 0.80
plus a 0.50× 1 chance of the paper being accepted, which is 0.90.
At the other extreme, it is certain that the paper will be rejected
at the unknown journal: now the chance is just 0.50 × 0.80 =
0.40 that the paper will be accepted. To be coherent, then, the
probability we can set for the paper being accepted has to lie in
the interval [0.4, 0.9]. Anything outside of this range is incon-
sistent with probability theory. Table 3 shows the formulae for
computing this interval for both MP (the case considered) here,
and the other three conditional inferences (see Pfeifer andKleiter,
2009). Note that it is not just the valid inferences that are con-
strained by coherence. We can compute intervals for all four
cases. A study has been reported testing participants for coher-
ence with these equations (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010). We also
do this but with a different experimental method, as described
below.
A probabilistic theory of conditional inference has been pre-
sented by Oaksford and Chater (2007; see also Oaksford et al.,
2000), and readers may wonder how this relates to the current
analysis. These authors consider contexts in which the major
premise of a conditional inference is uncertain, but the minor
premise is certain. For example, Dr Adler might herself be certain
where she will submit her paper. With P(p) = 1, the MP interval
collapses to P(q) = P(q|p), which is what Oaksford and Chater
give as the probability of the conclusion of MP. Their equations
for other inferences also take point values for the same reason.
Note that participants who conform to Oaksford and Chater’s
equations will necessarily be in the intervals of Table 3. How-
ever, we cannot test conformity to their specific equations here,
because the minor premises in our materials will rarely be cer-
tain (see also Oaksford and Chater, 2013, for an extension of their
theory). Indeed, a key purpose of our study is to explore how peo-
ple take into account the uncertainty in both premises when they
reason with conditionals.
The Study
In this study we examine the manner in which naïve partici-
pants will assign probabilities to both premises and conclusions
of uncertain arguments. In view of the paucity of data on uncer-
tain deduction our principal aim is to discover the extent to which
such assignments conform to the two normative standards out-
lined above: probabilistic validity and coherence with probability
theory. Pfeifer and Kleiter (2010) have already reported experi-
ments on uncertain deductions, which they laid out as explicit
conditional inferences (see also Singmann et al., 2014). They pre-
sented arbitrary premises with explicit probabilities attached and
asked participants to indicate the range of probabilities within
which the conclusion could fall. These could be compared with
the normative equations shown in Table 3. They found generally
good coherence for MP, but much poorer coherence for the other
three inferences.
Our own method differs from of that Pfeifer and Kleiter in
several ways. In place of premises with probabilities assigned
by the experimenter, we used conditional statements concerning
current affairs with evoke real world beliefs (see Supplementary
Material). Probabilities were not assigned by the experimenter
but taken from the participants themselves. We did this in two
different ways. In a Belief group, participants assigned proba-
bilities to the conditionals in one task—P(if p then q)—and to
the relevant event probabilities in another—that is P(p), P(not-
p), P(q), and P(not-q). This is not a reasoning task, of course, and
thus can be used to measure what internal consistency, if any,
is present in the beliefs expressed. This method has long been
used in judgment and decision making, leading most famously to
the discovery of the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman,
1983) discussed above.
Our secondmethod, more similar to that of Pfeifer and Kleiter
(2010), was to lay out the statements as an explicit inference as in
the following example:
GIVEN
If more people use sun screen then cases of skin cancer will be
reduced
More people will use sun screen
THEREFORE
Cases of skin cancer will be reduced
Participants also assigned probabilities to the three statements
here with the inferential structure now clearly cued. We differ
from Pfeifer and Kleiter in that our participants provide their
own premise probabilities and assign a point value, rather than an
interval, to the conclusion. This method allows people to correct
incoherence in their belief system as they can now reason explic-
itly about the way in which uncertainty in the premises should be
reflected in the conclusion. We therefore expect stronger confor-
mity to both p-validity and coherence measures in the Inference
group.
Method
Participants
Forty six undergraduate students of the University of
Saskatchewan participated, with 23 assigned to each of the
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two experimental groups; Psychology students received course
credits and others were paid for their participation.
Procedure
A set of 48 conditional statements were used concerning real
world causal relations, similar to those in previous studies of the
authors (Over et al., 2007) run on British participants, and known
to vary widely in believability. All concerned causal relations in
real world events, such as “If more people use sun screen then
cases of skin cancer will be reduced.” Where necessary, the sen-
tences were adapted to be relevant to the Canadian context. The
sentences used are shown in Supplementary Material. The tasks
were administered via computer software with the experimenter
present. Participants were instructed that they would be receiving
groups of statements which applied to Canada within the next 10
years, and that following each statement they would be asked to
indicate the degree to which they believed the statement to be
true (expressed as a percentage probability from 0 to 100%). All
ratings were provided on a sliding scale located below each of the
statements. Participants indicated their responses by clicking a
bar on the scale and dragging it to the desired belief percentage. In
the Belief group, participants assigned subjective probabilities to
a randomized list of the 48 conditionals sentences and separately
to a randomized list of the minor premises and conclusions cor-
responding to each sentence. For example, they gave probabilities
for “more people will use sun screen,” “more people will not use
sun screen,” “skin cancer rates will be reduced,” and “skin cancer
rates will not be reduced” at some point in the list.
In the Inference group, as described above, participant’s
assigned probabilities to statements grouped as inferences with
major premise, minor premise and conclusion rated in imme-
diate succession with the whole argument visible. The headings
GIVEN (before the premises) and THEREFORE (before the con-
clusion were also included). This resulted in another difference
between the two groups: those in the inference group rated the
same conditional sentence four times in different places as it
appeared with each of the inference types, whereas in the belief
group, each conditional sentence was rated only once. The order
of presentation of each argument was fully randomized so that
arguments using the same conditional statement could appear
anywhere in the sequence.
Results
As pointed out in the introduction, tests for p-validity are insen-
sitive when the premise probabilities are low. For this reason, all
analyses of p-validity reported are for a reduced set of 24 condi-
tional sentences (mean = 60.6, SD = 11.3, Belief group ratings)
with substantially higher degrees of belief in the major premise
(conditional statement) than the other 24 (mean = 44.5, SD =
13.8). Coherence measures do not suffer from the same prob-
lem, so these analyses were conducted using the full set of 48
sentences.
Hit Rates
Our first analyses concern the number of responses considered
correct by our two main indices, p-validity and coherence. In
each case we can define an interval within which the conclusion
probability should be assigned. In case of p-validity, the conclu-
sions have a maximum level of uncertainty, determined by the
values actually assigned to the premises. This has to be computed
separately for each participant and for each conditional sentence.
In the example (A) discussed above, the maximum uncertainty
of the conclusion was 0.3, meaning that the minimum probabil-
ity value for the conclusion was 0.7. We call this value minP. A
value of minP was computed from the premises for each partic-
ipant problem and compared with the value actually assigned by
the participant to the conclusion. Any value of minP or above
was scored as making a “hit,” whether the inference was norma-
tively p-valid, MP andMT, or not, AC andDA (as the participants
might consider any of these inferences “valid”). Note that where
themaximum uncertainty was 1 or more (as in example B above),
minP was set equal to zero. (See Table 3 for formal definition
of the correct interval for the conclusion probability.) A similar
approach was used for the coherence analysis, except that here
we need to compute two values for the conclusion—minP and
maxP—using the equations shown in Table 3. Again this target
interval depends on the actual probabilities assigned by each par-
ticipant to each pair of premises. In the coherence analysis, any
conclusion probability assigned in the interval [minP, max P] was
scored as a hit. (Note that for any given problem minP is com-
puted differently for p-validity than coherence and will not take
the same value.)
The frequency of hits for p-validity in the two groups are
shown in the white bars of Figures 1, 2 (reduced set of higher
belief conditionals); an analysis of the chance rates (black bars)
is presented in a subsequent section. For the purpose of the
ANOVA, we split the four inferences into two factors: Validity
(MP, MT vs. DA, AC) and Polarity (MP, AC vs. DA, MT). The
main purpose for doing this was to see more clearly whether
classically defined valid inferences differed on our measures. In
particular, we might expect greater conformity to p-validity on
valid inferences, since p-validity is only normatively required for
these. The ANOVA revealed several significant findings. As pre-
dicted, the Inference group had more hits (mean 0.87) than the
Belief group (0.82) [F(1, 44) = 4.27, MSE = 0.090, η
2
p = 0.088,
p < 0.05]. Contrary to expectations, however, invalid infer-
ences (0.87) had significantly higher p-validity scores than valid
inferences (0.83) [F(1, 44) = 9.16, MSE = 0.064, η
2
p = 0.172,
p < 0.005]. There was also an interaction between the two fac-
tors [F(1, 44) = 9.66, MSE = 0.067, η
2
p = 0.180, p < 0.005] such
that the (reverse) validity effect showed only in the Belief group
(compare Figures 1, 2).
We performed an ANOVA for the coherence hit rates (all con-
ditionals) with the same factors—see white bars of Figures 3,
4. There were three significant main effects: Group [F(1, 44) =
17.02, MSE = 0.567, η2p = 0.279, p < 0.001], as predicted with
higher hit rates for the Inference group (0.62) than the Belief
group (0.51); Validity [F(1,44) = 12.88, MSE= 0.016, η
2
p = 0.226,
p < 0.001]—again higher scores for invalid (0.58) than valid
(0.56) inferences, and very large effect of Polarity [F(1, 44) =
52.74, MSE = 0.363, η2p = 0.545, p < 0.001] reflecting more hits
for affirmative (0.66) than negative (0.48) inferences. A Validity
by Group interaction [F(1, 44) = 12.88,MSE= 0.016, η
2
p = 0.226,
p < 0.001] indicated that the (reverse) validity effect was detected
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FIGURE 1 | p-validity analysis for the Inference group (Higher belief
conditionals).
FIGURE 2 | P-validity analysis for the Belief group (Higher belief
conditionals).
only for the Inference group (the opposite trend to that shown
in the p-validity analysis). Finally there was an interaction for
Polarity by Group [F(1, 44) = 13.07, MSE = 0.363, η
2
p = 0.229,
p < 0.001] reflecting a larger effect of Polarity in the Inference
than the Belief group.
Before discussing these findings, it is important to consider the
chance rates for assigning correct conclusion probabilities which
we do next.
Chance Rates
Uncertain deduction presents measurement problems unknown
to the standard deduction paradigm. With the old method each
conclusion is either valid or not and hence each response either
correct or not.With the newmethod, however, a correct response
or “hit” is a value lying within an interval: [minP, 1] for p-validity
and [minP, maxP] for coherence. Moreover, these ranges depend
upon not only the logical inference under consideration but
the actual probabilities assigned to the premises by a particular
participant on a particular problem.
The size of these ranges varies considerably and hence the par-
ticipant has a high chance of guessing the correct answer when
they are large. As pointed out in the introduction, where there is
low belief in the premises, minP for p-validity may be set to 0,
FIGURE 3 | Coherence analysis for the Inference group (all
conditionals).
FIGURE 4 | Coherence analysis for the Belief group (all conditionals).
so that any conclusion probability will be deemed a hit. For these
reasons, it seems essential to consider chance rates and to provide
analyses which correct for them2. We decided to use the range
of the target interval as a measure of chance level responding.
For example, with p-validity, if minP was 0.4, we took the value
1-minP = 0.6 to be the chance rate. This is because any partici-
pant generating random probabilities with a uniform distribution
between 0 and 1, would have a 0.6 chance of hitting the correct
interval. For coherence, we took the value (maxP—minP) to be
the chance rate for similar reasons. Hence, like hit rates, chance
rates have to be computed for each individual participant, condi-
tional and inference. Themean computed chance rates are shown
as black bars in Figures 1–4.
The first question is whether the observed hit rates were above
chance. To assess this, we first computed for each participant the
mean difference between hits and chance scores for each condi-
tional sentence, for each inference in both groups on both mea-
sures. We then compared these values to a mean of zero with a
one sample t test (two tailed, df = 22) in each case. Considering
first p-validity, as one might expect from Figure 1, scoring was
highly significantly above chance for MP and AC in the p-validity
2We thank Phil Johnson-Laird for alerting us to this problem.
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analysis of the Inference group. Neither DA nor MT were sig-
nificantly different from chance. For the Belief group (Figure 2)
hits were again significantly above chance for MP and AC but
significantly below chance for MT. In the coherence analysis for
the Inference group (Figure 3) scores were (significantly) above
chance for MP, DA, and AC but below chance for MT. In the
Belief group (Figure 4) all differences were significant with scores
above chance for MP and DA and below for AC and MT.
Overall, scores were above chance in the majority of cases, but
with exceptions. In particular scores for MT tended to be below
chance. The high chance rates clearly complicate the interpreta-
tion of the analyses of hits reported above. Hence, we decided to
repeat these analyses using chance corrected scores, so that the
value (hits-chance) was entered as the dependent variable. We
refer to these as performance scores.
Chance Corrected ANOVAs
Analysis of p-validity
An analysis of variance of was run on the performance scores
(hits—chance) for both groups combined on the reduced set of 24
sentences. The factors were Group (Belief vs. Inference), Polar-
ity (MP, AC vs. DA, MT), and Validity (MP, MT vs. AC, DA).
All three main effects were statistically significant, the largest
being polarity [F(1, 44) = 132.25, MSE = 1.198, η
2
p = 0.750,
p < 0.001], indicating that performance was better on affirma-
tive inferences (MP, AC; mean 0.138) than negative inferences
(DA,MT; mean—0.023) as is evident from Figures 1, 2when hits
and chance are compared. There was a significant effect of Group
[F(1, 44) = 17.95,MSE= 0.200, η
2
p = 0.290, p < 0.001], showing,
as predicted, better performance in the Inference (0.090) than
Belief group (0.025). Validity [F(1, 44) = 10.58, MSE = 0.031,
η
2
p = 0.194, p < 0.002] was also significant, as performance
was poorer on valid (0.044) than invalid (0.070) inferences due
to reversal on MT. There were two significant interactions, one
of which was relatively large: Polarity by Group [F(1, 44) = 9.74,
MSE= 0.088, η2p = 0.181, p < 0.003]. It is evident from the Fig-
ures that the Polarity effect was substantially attenuated in the
Belief group. There was also a small but significant three way
interaction between Group, Polarity and Validity [F(1, 44) = 4.24,
MSE= 0.008, η2p = 0.088, p < 0.05].
Analysis of coherence
Coherence tests apply regardless of the believability of the con-
ditional statement, and so for this measure we report analyses of
all 48 sentences. Chance and hit rates are shown on this measure
in Figures 3, 4 for the Inference and Belief groups respectively.
For the Inference group, performance appears to be well above
chance for MP, DA, and AC but below chance for MT. Perfor-
mance appears lower generally in the Belief group but the reverse
trend for MT is still present.
The ANOVA for performance scores produced three large
effects: Group [F(1, 44) = 16.63. MSE = 0.523, η
2
p = 0.437, p <
0.001] with higher scores for Inference (0.091) than Belief (0.016);
Polarity [F(1, 44) = 47.87, MSE = 0.332, η
2
p = 0.521, p < 0.001
with higher scores for MP, AC (0.096)] than for DA, MT (0.011);
and Validity by Polarity [F(1, 44) = 167.95, MSE = 1.230, η
2
p
= 0.792, p < 0.001]. The main effect of Polarity and its inter-
action with Validity reflect the fact that performance reversed
on MT for both groups (see Figures 3, 4). Also significant in
this analysis were Validity [F(1, 44) = 7.59, MSE = 0.033, η
2
p =
0.147, p < 0.01], Polarity by Group [F(1, 44) = 18.77, MSE =
0.130, η2p = 0.299, p < 0.001] and Group by Validity by Polarity
[F(1, 44) = 8.82, MSE = 0.065. η
2
p = 0.167, p < 0.01]. The valid-
ity effect is also due to poor performance on MT. The three way
interaction reflects the fact that the Group by Validity interaction
was more marked in the Inference group where performance on
inferences other than MT was higher.
Statement Probabilities
As indicated above, chance calculations depend upon the proba-
bilities participants assign to the premises of each argument. Hit
rates depend on the conclusion probability assigned. To aid in
interpretation of the above findings, we examined the ratings of
these statements directly. First, we looked at major premises—
the conditional statements themselves. We checked for the Infer-
ence group whether conditionals were rated differently on the
four occasions they appeared (with each inference). They did not,
mean scores being almost identical. We compared the average of
these with the single ratings of the same conditionals in the Belief
group and they were again similar: Inference 45.2 (SD 19.1),
Belief 47.3 (SD 23.4). A t test conducted across the 48 sentences
showed no significant difference (t = 0.62).
Then we considered the ratings of the events p, not-p, q and
not-q which comprise the minor premises and conclusions for
the arguments. In the Belief group these are only rated once, but
in the Inference group each is rated twice, once when acting as a
premise (e.g., p for MP) and once as a conclusion (e.g., p for AC).
Ratings as premises and conclusion were again extremely simi-
lar in all cases. There were however, substantial differences in the
ratings given to affirmative events (p and q) with a mean of 0.52
and for negative events (not-p and not-q) with a mean of 0.39.
This effect was very large as shown by an ANOVA [F(1, 44) =
82.53, MSE = 0.324, η2p = 0.652, p < 0.0001]. There was also
marginally significant (p < 0.06) trend for antecedent events
(0.48) to be rated higher than consequent events (0.45).
It is important to note that ratings of affirmative and negative
events were incoherent, i.e., inconsistent with probability theory.
As Figure 5 illustrates, the sum of events and their negations was
less than one in all cases, whether calculated for the full sets of
48 conditionals or the reduced set of 24. This incoherence has
important implications for our findings. In the p-validity analyses
(Figures 1, 2) chance rates were significantly higher for DA and
MT which make use of negated events. This would follow from
underestimation of negative events, because as we have shown
earlier, lower belief in premises results in larger ranges for hits on
this measure. It also affects chance rates for coherence measures
(Figures 3, 4) but in the opposite direction. If assignments were
coherent, then we would compute the same chance rates for MP
and DA and the same for AC and MT. The former pair use P(p)
and 1—P(p), which should add to one, the latter P(q) and 1—P(q)
which should also add to one.
To see why underestimating negative event probabilities
reduces chance scores for the coherence measure, we take an
example. Suppose for a particular conditional a participant sets
P(q|p) = 0.7, P(p) = 0.6 and P(not-p) = 0.32. This shows the
typical bias in our experiment, as P(p) + P(not-p) = 0.92 overall.
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FIGURE 5 | Stacked bar chart showing probabilities assigned to events
and their negations. B, Belief group; I, Inference group; 48, full set of
conditionals; 24, reduced set; p, antecedent event (black bar p, white bar
not-p); q, consequent event (black bar q, white bar not-q).
When we compute the hit interval for MP, by the equations given
in Table 1, we get [0.42, 0.82] with a chance calculation of 0.40.
Had P(not-p) been assigned coherently, i.e., to 0.4, the interval
for DA would compute to be [0.12, 0.58] again with a chance rate
of 0.40. However, it is underestimated, resulting in a computed
interval of [0.476, 0.796] and a chance rate of 0.32 which is lower
than is should be.
Discussion
The objective of the present study was to investigate the accu-
racy with which people can make probability judgments about
the premises and conclusions of conditional inferences, and to
test whether this accuracy, as measured by Bayesian standards,
is increased by explicit conditional reasoning. We appealed to
the standards of p-validity and coherence. We used two meth-
ods: a Belief group who rated beliefs in the statements presented
separately, and an Inference group who saw them grouped as an
explicit inference. We found that our participants did conform to
p-validity at rates significantly higher than chance, but only for
the affirmative inferencesMP and AC. This performance was also
significantly higher for the Inference group. Results were similar
for the coherence measure. Again performance was well above
chance for MP and AC, and significantly better for the Inference
group. However, the results for the denial inference DA and MT
were more complex, as participants were above chance for the
former and below chance for the latter.
Asmust be evident to the reader, the study of uncertain deduc-
tion is a good deal more complex than use of the traditional
deduction paradigm. In the traditional method, each inference
is classified as valid or invalid and the participant either does or
does not endorse the inference. To study uncertain deduction we
must allow participants to assign probabilities to the premises
and the conclusions of deductive arguments. The difficulty then
comes in assessing whether they have done this correctly. First,
there is not one but two different measures that can be taken: p-
validity and coherence. Second, each of these allows participants
to assign a conclusion probability within an interval. This interval
must be computed for each participant on each problem sepa-
rately depending on the premise probabilities assigned. Finally,
these intervals can be large, creating the problem that participants
may hit them by chance. We have shown in this paper how to
compute these chance intervals and proposed method to correct
hits rates for guessing.
Very little previous work has been conducted on uncertain
deduction, despite apparent enthusiasm for a new paradigm psy-
chology of reasoning based on degrees of belief rather than black
and white truth judgments. The methodology introduced here
differs in significant ways from the study of Pfeifer and Kleiter
(2009, 2010) who studied only coherence (not p-validity), using
premise probabilities assigned by the experimenter and allowing
participants to assign a range of probabilities to the conclusion.
Their results differ from ours in that they found coherence to be
good only for MP, whereas we find this to be the case for MP, AC,
and DA. This could reflect the difference in response method, but
we think it more likely due to our use of realistic, causal-temporal
conditional statements which introduce real world experience of
causal relations. (We have no account of the reversal on MT,
however.) In addition to assessing the coherence of conclusion
probabilities taken as point ratings, we believe this to be the first
psychological study to measure directly whether people conform
to p-validity when both major and minor premises are taken to
be uncertain. In both cases, this means that a range of values
are acceptable as a “hit” on either measure. We consider our two
measures in turn.
Probabilistic validity, or p-validity, is a relatively weak mea-
sure for us. For generality and to minimize our assumptions, we
did not presuppose that P(if p then q)= P(q|p) in our assessment
of p-validity, but simply assessed whether participants express
no more uncertainty in the conclusion than in the premises of
our conditional inferences. This notion of validity does not con-
strain conclusion probabilities for the invalid inferences, AC and
DA, nor in effect, for valid inferences with low belief premises.
Hit rates generally exceeded chance in our study only for the
affirmative inferences MP and AC. Chance rates are disturbingly
high (black bars, Figures 1, 2) even with the analysis restricted to
the higher belief conditionals. Hence, we suggest that this mea-
sure will only be useful for problems where there is a very high
degree of belief in the premises. Nevertheless, we have some find-
ings of interest on this measure. First, as predicted, p-validity
scores are higher for the Inference than the Belief group, with
and without chance correction. The second finding of particular
interest is that participants did not conformmore to p-validity on
the inferences that are actually valid, MP and MT. Indeed there
was a small trend in the opposite direction. Much larger was an
effect of polarity such that participants performed better on the
affirmative inferences, MP and AC.
These findings can be accounted for as follows. First, the
chance rates are very high on DA and MT due to underesti-
mation of negative event probabilities, as explained earlier. This
creates a ceiling effect for these two inferences, making it dif-
ficult for participants to perform above chance. This does not
explain, however, why performance is equally high on MP and
AC and facilitated for the Inference group in both cases. Research
in the traditional paradigm often showed high endorsement of
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AC, though it is both classically invalid and p-invalid (Evans
and Over, 2004). It may be that the participants interpreted the
assertion of our causal-temporal conditionals (in Supplementary
Material) if p then q as also pragmatically implying if q then p,
making AC in effectMP in the other direction. That could explain
their apparently equal effort to generate a p-valid conclusion in
the Inference group for AC as for MP. In a study corresponding
to our Inference group, Singmann et al. (2014) assessed p-validity
only for MP and MT, and found that participants conformed to
p-validity for MP and not MT. Still, as we have explained above,
pragmatic factors can have a large effect people’s reasoning. There
could be pragmatic differences in thematerials used by Singmann
et al. and ourselves, and further research must investigate this
possibility.
It could also be suggested that our use of causal-temporal con-
ditionals, if p then q, implies not only that P(q|p) is high but that
P(q|not-p) is low, in conformity with the delta-p rule, P(q|p)—
P(q|not-p), which measures how far that p raises the probability
of q. It is true that, when p causes q, p would normally be thought
to raise the probability of q, but previous work has not found
that people interpret causal-temporal conditionals in terms of the
delta-p rule (see Over et al., 2007, and especially Singmann et al.,
2014, on this rule).
Use of the coherencemeasures allows us to ask whether people
are coherent in the beliefs they express about conditional state-
ments and their component events. This measure is stronger than
that of p-validity and is applicable to both p-valid and p-invalid
inferences. But the equations we use for coherence do assume that
P(if p then q) = P(q|p), which, as we explained above, is often
called the Equation (Edgington, 1995). Examining the data, we
have found again that coherence is better for the Inference than
the Belief group, again with and without chance correction. As
with p-validity, these analyses are affected by the underestimation
of negative event probabilities, which in this case causes chance
rates to drop somewhat for DA and MT. But it is striking that
the facilitation of coherence in the Inference group is restricted
to MP, DA, and AC, as can be seen by comparing Figures 3, 4
(see yet again Singmann et al., 2014, and recall our point about
possible pragmatic differences between their materials and ours).
Interpretation of findings on the negative inferences, DA and
MT, is clearly complicated by the underestimation of negative
event probabilities we have observed. If we focus our attention
on the affirmative inferences, MP and AC, however, it is clear
that participants perform well above chance on both measures
in the Inference group. In other words when given the oppor-
tunity to see the statements grouped as an inference, untrained
participants do seem to grasp intuitively the logical restrictions
that premise probabilities place upon conclusion probabilities.
The actual hit rates are well over 80% for p-validity and around
75% for coherence. We find these figures quite encouraging, as
supporting the conclusion that one way to improve Bayesian rea-
soning is by the use of explicit inferences. Explicit reasoning may
not always make people rational by Bayesian standards, but it can
help (see also Cruz et al., 2015).
Uncertain deduction is central to the new paradigm psychol-
ogy of reasoning. If research is to progress, we must find methods
for studying the relation between belief in premises and belief in
conclusions. It is, as we have shown, a much trickier task than
that presented by the standard deduction paradigm. There are a
number of pointers to future research studies arising from our
findings. For example, studies of p-validity should be restricted
to problems with high belief (but still uncertain) premises, in
order to provide sufficient sensitivity. We have also highlighted
a problem with explicitly negated premises. Events expressed as
negations tend to be underestimated in their probabilities, pro-
viding an immediate source of incoherence. This could be related
to the findings in “support theory” of subaddivity: that the weight
given to an implicit disjunction is less than the sum of its dis-
juncts when these are made explicit (Tversky and Koehler, 1994).
A negated event is itself an implicit disjunction; that is, not-A
consists of B v C v . . . , which are the explicit alternatives. For
example, the probability assigned to “school class sizes are not
reduced” might be less than the sum that would be assigned to
“school class sizes are increased” and “school class sizes remain
the same.” In any event, this problemmust be addressed in future
studies of the coherence of negated inferences3.
We believe that there is much to be gained from the further
study of the coherence of conditional beliefs, as in our Belief
group. We have noted above the rich literature that resulted
from the discovery of the conjunction fallacy. The representa-
tiveness heuristic that Tversky and Kahneman (1983) proposed
as an explanation of this incoherence in conjunctive beliefs might
also cause some incoherence in conditional beliefs, but other, as
yet unknown heuristics could play a role as well. We hope to
have demonstrated here, however, that the study of deductive rea-
soning using Bayesian methods should move beyond the almost
exclusive focus on the inference from p and q to q and the asso-
ciated conjunction fallacy. There is much more to discover about
Bayesian reasoning by studying other deductive inferences with
uncertain premises.
In an ideal Bayesian world, probabilities assigned to logically
related statements would be perfectly coherent with probability
theory, but in reality this is unlikely to hold, especially when the
statements are not explicitly related as inferences. Such proba-
bilities are unlikely to be assigned on an absolute basis due to
the power of pragmatics in human communication and under-
standing. We interpret statements in their context, amplifying
their meanings and making probability judgments with implicit
heuristics. It is unsurprising that people’s beliefs are not fully
coherent. It is impossible for them to ensure absolute coherence,
even in relatively simple beliefs, due computationally intractabil-
ity. However, it is of great interest to discover the causes of inco-
herence in conditional beliefs, such as the difficulty with negative
events reported here.
Grouping uncertain statements together as an inference is a
natural way to extend the traditional deduction paradigm to the
study of uncertain deduction. The fact that participants in our
Inference group consistently performed better than participants
in the Belief group might suggest that the former were interven-
ing with explicit reasoning in order the make their judgments
3The coherence intervals of Table 3 are derived using the total probability theo-
rem of probability theory. See Hadjichristidis et al. (2014) on this theorem and
their findings of superaddivity.
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more consistent. Further research will be needed, however, to
determine whether this is in fact that case. An alternative prag-
matic account is that concurrent presentation of premises and
conclusions contextualizes the statements together so that judg-
ments become more consistent without any conscious effort of
reasoning. If explicit reasoning is involved, this could be indi-
cated by examining performance under working memory load or
by correlating performance with individual measures of cognitive
ability. These are among the methods employed by dual process
researchers to identify effortful reasoning (Evans and Stanovich,
2013).
In conclusion, we hope to have developed a methodology that
can be adapted for a variety of future uses in the new psychol-
ogy of deduction. We have shown that it is feasible to study the
relation between the degree of belief that people hold in premises
and conclusion of a logical argument. We have also shown that
such judgments are not random and conform to the coherence
of probability theory at rates well above that which could be
expected by chance. People have some problems with the coher-
ence of their judgments about negative events, but are otherwise
fairly good, by Bayesian standards, at conditional reasoning.
Their performance is at an even higher level when statements are
grouped together into explicit conditional inferences.
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